every case that occurs； what is good； what bad； conformably to duty or
inconsistent with it； if； without in the least teaching them
anything new； we only； like Socrates； direct their attention to the
principle they themselves employ； and that； therefore； we do not
need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and
good； yea； even wise and virtuous。 Indeed we might well have
conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound
to do； and therefore also to know； would be within the reach of
every man； even the commonest。 Here we cannot forbear admiration
when we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over
the theoretical in the common understanding of men。 In the latter；
if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and
from the perceptions of the senses； it falls into mere
inconceivabilities and self…contradictions； at least into a chaos of
uncertainty； obscurity； and instability。 But in the practical sphere
it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs
from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show
itself to advantage。 It then becomes even subtle； whether it be that
it chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting
what is to be called right； or whether it desires for its own
instruction to determine honestly the worth of actions； and； in the
latter case； it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as
any philosopher whatever can promise himself。 Nay； it is almost more
sure of doing so； because the philosopher cannot have any other
principle； while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of
considerations foreign to the matter； and so turn aside from the right
way。 Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in
the judgement of common reason； or at most only to call in
philosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more
complete and intelligible； and its rules more convenient for use
（especially for disputation）； but not so as to draw off the common
understanding from its happy simplicity； or to bring it by means of
philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction？
Innocence is indeed a glorious thing； only； on the other hand； it is
very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced。 On
this account even wisdom… which otherwise consists more in conduct
than in knowledge… yet has need of science； not in order to learn from
it； but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence。 Against
all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so
deserving of respect； he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in
his wants and inclinations； the entire satisfaction of which he sums
up under the name of happiness。 Now reason issues its commands
unyieldingly； without promising anything to the inclinations； and；
as it were； with disregard and contempt for these claims； which are so
impetuous； and at the same time so plausible； and which will not allow
themselves to be suppressed by any command。 Hence there arises a
natural dialectic； i。e。； a disposition； to argue against these
strict laws of duty and to question their validity； or at least
their purity and strictness； and； if possible； to make them more
accordant with our wishes and inclinations； that is to say； to corrupt
them at their very source； and entirely to destroy their worth… a
thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good。
Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its
sphere； and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy；
not to satisfy any speculative want （which never occurs to it as
long as it is content to be mere sound reason）； but even on
practical grounds； in order to attain in it information and clear
instruction respecting the source of its principle； and the correct
determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on
wants and inclinations； so that it may escape from the perplexity of
opposite claims and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral
principles through the equivocation into which it easily falls。
Thus； when practical reason cultivates itself； there insensibly arises
in it a dialetic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy； just as
happens to it in its theoretic use； and in this case； therefore； as
well as in the other； it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough
critical examination of our reason。
SECOND SECTION
TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY
TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use
of our practical reason； it is by no means to be inferred that we have
treated it as an empirical notion。 On the contrary； if we attend to
the experience of men's conduct； we meet frequent and； as we ourselves
allow； just complaints that one cannot find a single certain example
of the disposition to act from pure duty。 Although many things are
done in conformity with what duty prescribes； it is nevertheless
always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty； so as to
have a moral worth。 Hence there have at all times been philosophers
who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at
all in human actions； and have ascribed everything to a more or less
refined self…love。 Not that they have on that account questioned the
soundness of the conception of morality； on the contrary； they spoke
with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature；
which； though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of
respect； is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to
give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest
of the inclinations； whether singly or at the best in the greatest
possible harmony with one another。
In fact； it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience
with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action；
however right in itself； rested simply on moral grounds and on the
conception of duty。 Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest
self…examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of
duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or
that action and to so great a sacrifice； yet we cannot from this infer
with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of
self…love； under the false appearance of duty； that was the actual
determining cause of the will。 We like them to flatter ourselves by
falsely taking credit for a more noble motive； whereas in fact we
can never； even by the strictest examination； get completely behind
the secret springs of action； since； when the question is of moral
worth； it is not with the actions which we see that we are
concerned； but with those inward principles of them which we do not
see。
Moreover； we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule
all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination over stepping
itself from vanity； than by conceding to them that notions of duty
must be drawn only from experience （as from indolence； people are
ready to think is also the case with all other notions）； for or is
to prepare for them a certain triumph。 I am willing to admit out of
love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct； but if
we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which
is always prominent； and it is this they have in view and not the
strict command of duty which would often require self…denial。
Without being an enemy of virtue； a cool observer； one that does not
mistake the wish for good； however lively； for its reality； may
sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in
the world； and this especially as years increase and the judgement
is partly made wiser by experience and partly； also； more acute in
observation。 This being so； nothing can secure us from falling away
altogether from our ideas of duty； or maintain in the soul a
well…grounded respect for its law； but the clear conviction that
although there should never have been actions which really sprang from
such pure sources； yet whether this or that takes place is not at
all the question； but that reason of itself； independent on all
experience； ordains what ought to take place； that accordingly actions
of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example； the
feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds
everything on experience； are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by
reason； that； e。g。； even though there might never yet have been a
sincere friend； yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in
friendship required of every man； because； prior to all experience；
this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining
the will by a priori principles。
When we add further that； unless we deny that the notion of morality
has any truth or reference to any possible object； we must admit
that its law must be valid； not merely for men but for all rational
creatures generally； not merely under certain contingent conditions or
with exceptions but with absolute necessity； then it is clear that
no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such
apodeictic laws。 For with what right could we bring into unbounded
respect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which
perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity？ Or how
could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the
determination of the will of rational beings generally； and for us
only as such； if they were merely empirical and did not take their
origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason？
Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should
wish to derive it from examples。 For every example of it that is set
before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality；
whether it is worthy