fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第7部分

will；　then　the　actions　of　such　a　being　which　are　recognised　as

objectively　necessary　are　subjectively　necessary　also；　i。e。；　the

will　is　a　faculty　to　choose　that　only　which　reason　independent　of

inclination　recognises　as　practically　necessary；　i。e。；　as　good。　But　if

reason　of　itself　does　not　sufficiently　determine　the　will；　if　the

latter　is　subject　also　to　subjective　conditions　（particular

impulses）　which　do　not　always　coincide　with　the　objective

conditions；　in　a　word；　if　the　will　does　not　in　itself　completely

accord　with　reason　（which　is　actually　the　case　with　men）；　then　the

actions　which　objectively　are　recognised　as　necessary　are　subjectively

contingent；　and　the　determination　of　such　a　will　according　to

objective　laws　is　obligation；　that　is　to　say；　the　relation　of　the

objective　laws　to　a　will　that　is　not　thoroughly　good　is　conceived　as

the　determination　of　the　will　of　a　rational　being　by　principles　of

reason；　but　which　the　will　from　its　nature　does　not　of　necessity

follow。

　　The　conception　of　an　objective　principle；　in　so　far　as　it　is

obligatory　for　a　will；　is　called　a　command　（of　reason）；　and　the

formula　of　the　command　is　called　an　imperative。

　　All　imperatives　are　expressed　by　the　word　ought　＇or　shall＇；　and

thereby　indicate　the　relation　of　an　objective　law　of　reason　to　a　will；

which　from　its　subjective　constitution　is　not　necessarily　determined

by　it　（an　obligation）。　They　say　that　something　would　be　good　to　do

or　to　forbear；　but　they　say　it　to　a　will　which　does　not　always　do　a

thing　because　it　is　conceived　to　be　good　to　do　it。　That　is　practically

good；　however；　which　determines　the　will　by　means　of　the　conceptions

of　reason；　and　consequently　not　from　subjective　causes；　but

objectively；　that　is　on　principles　which　are　valid　for　every

rational　being　as　such。　It　is　distinguished　from　the　pleasant；　as　that

which　influences　the　will　only　by　means　of　sensation　from　merely

subjective　causes；　valid　only　for　the　sense　of　this　or　that　one；　and

not　as　a　principle　of　reason；　which　holds　for　every　one。*



　　*The　dependence　of　the　desires　on　sensations　is　called

inclination；　and　this　accordingly　always　indicates　a　want。　The

dependence　of　a　contingently　determinable　will　on　principles　of　reason

is　called　an　interest。　This　therefore；　is　found　only　in　the　case　of

a　dependent　will　which　does　not　always　of　itself　conform　to　reason；　in

the　Divine　will　we　cannot　conceive　any　interest。　But　the　human　will

can　also　take　an　interest　in　a　thing　without　therefore　acting　from

interest。　The　former　signifies　the　practical　interest　in　the　action；

the　latter　the　pathological　in　the　object　of　the　action。　The　former

indicates　only　dependence　of　the　will　on　principles　of　reason　in

themselves；　the　second；　dependence　on　principles　of　reason　for　the

sake　of　inclination；　reason　supplying　only　the　practical　rules　how　the

requirement　of　the　inclination　may　be　satisfied。　In　the　first　case　the

action　interests　me；　in　the　second　the　object　of　the　action　（because

it　is　pleasant　to　me）。　We　have　seen　in　the　first　section　that　in　an

action　done　from　duty　we　must　look　not　to　the　interest　in　the

object；　but　only　to　that　in　the　action　itself；　and　in　its　rational

principle　（viz。；　the　law）。



　　A　perfectly　good　will　would　therefore　be　equally　subject　to

objective　laws　（viz。；　laws　of　good）；　but　could　not　be　conceived　as

obliged　thereby　to　act　lawfully；　because　of　itself　from　its　subjective

constitution　it　can　only　be　determined　by　the　conception　of　good。

Therefore　no　imperatives　hold　for　the　Divine　will；　or　in　general　for　a

holy　will；　ought　is　here　out　of　place；　because　the　volition　is　already

of　itself　necessarily　in　unison　with　the　law。　Therefore　imperatives

are　only　formulae　to　express　the　relation　of　objective　laws　of　all

volition　to　the　subjective　imperfection　of　the　will　of　this　or　that

rational　being；　e。g。；　the　human　will。

　　Now　all　imperatives　command　either　hypothetically　or

categorically。　The　former　represent　the　practical　necessity　of　a

possible　action　as　means　to　something　else　that　is　willed　（or　at　least

which　one　might　possibly　will）。　The　categorical　imperative　would　be

that　which　represented　an　action　as　necessary　of　itself　without

reference　to　another　end；　i。e。；　as　objectively　necessary。

　　Since　every　practical　law　represents　a　possible　action　as　good

and；　on　this　account；　for　a　subject　who　is　practically　determinable　by

reason；　necessary；　all　imperatives　are　formulae　determining　an

action　which　is　necessary　according　to　the　principle　of　a　will　good　in

some　respects。　If　now　the　action　is　good　only　as　a　means　to

something　else；　then　the　imperative　is　hypothetical；　if　it　is

conceived　as　good　in　itself　and　consequently　as　being　necessarily

the　principle　of　a　will　which　of　itself　conforms　to　reason；　then　it　is

categorical。

　　Thus　the　imperative　declares　what　action　possible　by　me　would　be

good　and　presents　the　practical　rule　in　relation　to　a　will　which

does　not　forthwith　perform　an　action　simply　because　it　is　good；

whether　because　the　subject　does　not　always　know　that　it　is　good；　or

because；　even　if　it　know　this；　yet　its　maxims　might　be　opposed　to

the　objective　principles　of　practical　reason。

　　Accordingly　the　hypothetical　imperative　only　says　that　the　action　is

good　for　some　purpose；　possible　or　actual。　In　the　first　case　it　is　a

problematical；　in　the　second　an　assertorial　practical　principle。　The

categorical　imperative　which　declares　an　action　to　be　objectively

necessary　in　itself　without　reference　to　any　purpose；　i。e。；　without

any　other　end；　is　valid　as　an　apodeictic　（practical）　principle。

　　Whatever　is　possible　only　by　the　power　of　some　rational　being　may

also　be　conceived　as　a　possible　purpose　of　some　will；　and　therefore

the　principles　of　action　as　regards　the　means　necessary　to　attain　some

possible　purpose　are　in　fact　infinitely　numerous。　All　sciences　have

a　practical　part；　consisting　of　problems　expressing　that　some　end　is

possible　for　us　and　of　imperatives　directing　how　it　may　be　attained。

These　may；　therefore；　be　called　in　general　imperatives　of　skill。

Here　there　is　no　question　whether　the　end　is　rational　and　good；　but

only　what　one　must　do　in　order　to　attain　it。　The　precepts　for　the

physician　to　make　his　patient　thoroughly　healthy；　and　for　a　poisoner

to　ensure　certain　death；　are　of　equal　value　in　this　respect；　that　each

serves　to　effect　its　purpose　perfectly。　Since　in　early　youth　it　cannot

be　known　what　ends　are　likely　to　occur　to　us　in　the　course　of　life；

parents　seek　to　have　their　children　taught　a　great　many　things；　and

provide　for　their　skill　in　the　use　of　means　for　all　sorts　of　arbitrary

ends；　of　none　of　which　can　they　determine　whether　it　may　not　perhaps

hereafter　be　an　object　to　their　pupil；　but　which　it　is　at　all　events

possible　that　he　might　aim　at；　and　this　anxiety　is　so　great　that

they　commonly　neglect　to　form　and　correct　their　judgement　on　the　value

of　the　things　which　may　be　chosen　as　ends。

　　There　is　one　end；　however；　which　may　be　assumed　to　be　actually

such　to　all　rational　beings　（so　far　as　imperatives　apply　to　them；

viz。；　as　dependent　beings）；　and；　therefore；　one　purpose　which　they　not

merely　may　have；　but　which　we　may　with　certainty　assume　that　they

all　actually　have　by　a　natural　necessity；　and　this　is　happiness。　The

hypothetical　imperative　which　expresses　the　practical　necessity　of

an　action　as　means　to　the　advancement　of　happiness　is　assertorial。

We　are　not　to　present　it　as　necessary　for　an　uncertain　and　merely

possible　purpose；　but　for　a　purpose　which　we　may　presuppose　with

certainty　and　a　priori　in　every　man；　because　it　belongs　to　his

being。　Now　skill　in　the　choice　of　means　to　his　own　greatest　well…being

may　be　called　prudence；*　in　the　narrowest　sense。　And　thus　the

imperative　which　refers　to　the　choice　of　means　to　one's　own　happiness；

i。e。；　the　precept　of　prudence；　is　still　always　hypothetical；　the

action　is　not　commanded　absolutely；　but　only　as　means　to　another

purpose。



　　*The　word　prudence　is　taken　in　two　senses：　in　the　one　it　may　bear

the　name　of　knowledge　of　the　world；　in　the　other　that　of　private

prudence。　The　former　is　a　man's　ability　to　influence　others　so　as　to

use　them　for　his　own　purposes。　The　latter　is　the　sagacity　to　combine

all　these　purposes　for　his　own　lasting　benefit。　This　latter　is

properly　that　to　which　the　value　even　of　the　former　is　reduced；　and

when　a　man　is　prudent　in　the　former　sense；　but　not　in　the　latter；　we

might　better　say　of　him　that　he　is　clever　and　cunning；　but；　on　the

whole；　imprudent。



　　Finally；　there　is　an　imperative　which　commands　a　certain　conduct

immediately；　without　having　as　its　condition　any　other　purpose　to　be

attained　by　it。　This　imperative　is　categorical。　It　concerns　not　the

matter　of　the　action；　or　its　intended　result；　but　its　form　and　the

principle　of　which　it　is　itself　a　result；　and　what　is　essentially　good

in　it　consists　in　the　mental　disposition；　let　the　consequence　be

what　it　may。　This　imperative　may　be　called　that　of　morality。

　　There　is　a　marked　distinction　also　between　the　volitions　on　these

three　sorts　of　principles　in　the　dissimilarity　of　the　obligation　of

the　will。　In　order　to　mark　this　difference　more　clearly；　I　think

they　would　be　most　suitably　named　in　their　order　if　we　said　they　are

either　rules　of　skill；　or　counsels　of　prudence；　or　commands　（laws）

of　morality。　For　it　is　law　only　that　involves　the　conception　of　an

unconditional　and　objective　necessity；　which　is　consequently

universally　valid；　and　commands　are　laws　which　must　be　obeyed；　that

is；　must　be　followed；　even　in　opposition　to　inclination。　Counsels；

indeed；　involve　necessity；　but　one　which　can　only　hold　under　a

contingent　subjective　condition；　viz。；　they　depend　on　whether　this

or　that　man　reckons　this　or　that　as　part　of　his　happiness；　the

categorical　imperative；　on　the　contrary；　is　not　limited　by　any

condition；　and　as　being　absolutely；　although　practically；　necessary；

may　b