fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第8部分

categorical　imperative；　on　the　contrary；　is　not　limited　by　any

condition；　and　as　being　absolutely；　although　practically；　necessary；

may　be　quite　properly　called　a　command。　We　might　also　call　the　first

kind　of　imperatives　technical　（belonging　to　art）；　the　second

pragmatic*　（to　welfare）；　the　third　moral　（belonging　to　free　conduct

generally；　that　is；　to　morals）。



　　*It　seems　to　me　that　the　proper　signification　of　the　word

pragmatic　may　be　most　accurately　defined　in　this　way。　For　sanctions

are　called　pragmatic　which　flow　properly　not　from　the　law　of　the

states　as　necessary　enactments；　but　from　precaution　for　the　general

welfare。　A　history　is　composed　pragmatically　when　it　teaches　prudence；

i。e。；　instructs　the　world　how　it　can　provide　for　its　interests　better；

or　at　least　as　well　as；　the　men　of　former　time。



　　Now　arises　the　question；　how　are　all　these　imperatives　possible？

This　question　does　not　seek　to　know　how　we　can　conceive　the

accomplishment　of　the　action　which　the　imperative　ordains；　but

merely　how　we　can　conceive　the　obligation　of　the　will　which　the

imperative　expresses。　No　special　explanation　is　needed　to　show　how

an　imperative　of　skill　is　possible。　Whoever　wills　the　end；　wills

also　（so　far　as　reason　decides　his　conduct）　the　means　in　his　power

which　are　indispensably　necessary　thereto。　This　proposition　is；　as

regards　the　volition；　analytical；　for；　in　willing　an　object　as　my

effect；　there　is　already　thought　the　causality　of　myself　as　an

acting　cause；　that　is　to　say；　the　use　of　the　means；　and　the　imperative

educes　from　the　conception　of　volition　of　an　end　the　conception　of

actions　necessary　to　this　end。　Synthetical　propositions　must　no

doubt　be　employed　in　defining　the　means　to　a　proposed　end；　but　they　do

not　concern　the　principle；　the　act　of　the　will；　but　the　object　and　its

realization。　E。g。；　that　in　order　to　bisect　a　line　on　an　unerring

principle　I　must　draw　from　its　extremities　two　intersecting　arcs；　this

no　doubt　is　taught　by　mathematics　only　in　synthetical　propositions；

but　if　I　know　that　it　is　only　by　this　process　that　the　intended

operation　can　be　performed；　then　to　say　that；　if　I　fully　will　the

operation；　I　also　will　the　action　required　for　it；　is　an　analytical

proposition；　for　it　is　one　and　the　same　thing　to　conceive　something　as

an　effect　which　I　can　produce　in　a　certain　way；　and　to　conceive　myself

as　acting　in　this　way。

　　If　it　were　only　equally　easy　to　give　a　definite　conception　of

happiness；　the　imperatives　of　prudence　would　correspond　exactly　with

those　of　skill；　and　would　likewise　be　analytical。　For　in　this　case

as　in　that；　it　could　be　said：　〃Whoever　wills　the　end；　wills　also

（according　to　the　dictate　of　reason　necessarily）　the　indispensable

means　thereto　which　are　in　his　power。〃　But；　unfortunately；　the

notion　of　happiness　is　so　indefinite　that　although　every　man　wishes　to

at。　it；　yet　he　never　can　say　definitely　and　consistently　what　it　is

that　he　really　wishes　and　wills。　The　reason　of　this　is　that　all　the

elements　which　belong　to　the　notion　of　happiness　are　altogether

empirical；　i。e。；　they　must　be　borrowed　from　experience；　and

nevertheless　the　idea　of　happiness　requires　an　absolute　whole；　a

maximum　of　welfare　in　my　present　and　all　future　circumstances。　Now

it　is　impossible　that　the　most　clear…sighted　and　at　the　same　time　most

powerful　being　（supposed　finite）　should　frame　to　himself　a　definite

conception　of　what　he　really　wills　in　this。　Does　he　will　riches；　how

much　anxiety；　envy；　and　snares　might　he　not　thereby　draw　upon　his

shoulders？　Does　he　will　knowledge　and　discernment；　perhaps　it　might

prove　to　be　only　an　eye　so　much　the　sharper　to　show　him　so　much　the

more　fearfully　the　evils　that　are　now　concealed　from　him；　and　that

cannot　be　avoided；　or　to　impose　more　wants　on　his　desires；　which

already　give　him　concern　enough。　Would　he　have　long　life？　who

guarantees　to　him　that　it　would　not　be　a　long　misery？　would　he　at

least　have　health？　how　often　has　uneasiness　of　the　body　restrained

from　excesses　into　which　perfect　health　would　have　allowed　one　to

fall？　and　so　on。　In　short；　he　is　unable；　on　any　principle；　to

determine　with　certainty　what　would　make　him　truly　happy；　because　to

do　so　he　would　need　to　be　omniscient。　We　cannot　therefore　act　on　any

definite　principles　to　secure　happiness；　but　only　on　empirical

counsels；　e。g。　of　regimen；　frugality；　courtesy；　reserve；　etc。；　which

experience　teaches　do；　on　the　average；　most　promote　well…being。

Hence　it　follows　that　the　imperatives　of　prudence　do　not；　strictly

speaking；　command　at　all；　that　is；　they　cannot　present　actions

objectively　as　practically　necessary；　that　they　are　rather　to　be

regarded　as　counsels　（consilia）　than　precepts　precepts　of　reason；　that

the　problem　to　determine　certainly　and　universally　what　action　would

promote　the　happiness　of　a　rational　being　is　completely　insoluble；　and

consequently　no　imperative　respecting　it　is　possible　which　should；

in　the　strict　sense；　command　to　do　what　makes　happy；　because　happiness

is　not　an　ideal　of　reason　but　of　imagination；　resting　solely　on

empirical　grounds；　and　it　is　vain　to　expect　that　these　should　define

an　action　by　which　one　could　attain　the　totality　of　a　series　of

consequences　which　is　really　endless。　This　imperative　of　prudence

would　however　be　an　analytical　proposition　if　we　assume　that　the　means

to　happiness　could　be　certainly　assigned；　for　it　is　distinguished　from

the　imperative　of　skill　only　by　this；　that　in　the　latter　the　end　is

merely　possible；　in　the　former　it　is　given；　as　however　both　only

ordain　the　means　to　that　which　we　suppose　to　be　willed　as　an　end；　it

follows　that　the　imperative　which　ordains　the　willing　of　the　means

to　him　who　wills　the　end　is　in　both　cases　analytical。　Thus　there　is　no

difficulty　in　regard　to　the　possibility　of　an　imperative　of　this

kind　either。

　　On　the　other　hand；　the　question　how　the　imperative　of　morality　is

possible；　is　undoubtedly　one；　the　only　one；　demanding　a　solution；　as

this　is　not　at　all　hypothetical；　and　the　objective　necessity　which

it　presents　cannot　rest　on　any　hypothesis；　as　is　the　case　with　the

hypothetical　imperatives。　Only　here　we　must　never　leave　out　of

consideration　that　we　cannot　make　out　by　any　example；　in　other　words

empirically；　whether　there　is　such　an　imperative　at　all；　but　it　is

rather　to　be　feared　that　all　those　which　seem　to　be　categorical　may

yet　be　at　bottom　hypothetical。　For　instance；　when　the　precept　is：

〃Thou　shalt　not　promise　deceitfully〃；　and　it　is　assumed　that　the

necessity　of　this　is　not　a　mere　counsel　to　avoid　some　other　evil；　so

that　it　should　mean：　〃Thou　shalt　not　make　a　lying　promise；　lest　if

it　become　known　thou　shouldst　destroy　thy　credit；〃　but　that　an

action　of　this　kind　must　be　regarded　as　evil　in　itself；　so　that　the

imperative　of　the　prohibition　is　categorical；　then　we　cannot　show　with

certainty　in　any　example　that　the　will　was　determined　merely　by　the

law；　without　any　other　spring　of　action；　although　it　may　appear　to

be　so。　For　it　is　always　possible　that　fear　of　disgrace；　perhaps　also

obscure　dread　of　other　dangers；　may　have　a　secret　influence　on　the

will。　Who　can　prove　by　experience　the　non…existence　of　a　cause　when

all　that　experience　tells　us　is　that　we　do　not　perceive　it？　But　in

such　a　case　the　so…called　moral　imperative；　which　as　such　appears　to

be　categorical　and　unconditional；　would　in　reality　be　only　a　pragmatic

precept；　drawing　our　attention　to　our　own　interests　and　merely

teaching　us　to　take　these　into　consideration。

　　We　shall　therefore　have　to　investigate　a　priori　the　possibility　of　a

categorical　imperative；　as　we　have　not　in　this　case　the　advantage　of

its　reality　being　given　in　experience；　so　that　＇the　elucidation　of＇

its　possibility　should　be　requisite　only　for　its　explanation；　not

for　its　establishment。　In　the　meantime　it　may　be　discerned

beforehand　that　the　categorical　imperative　alone　has　the　purport　of

a　practical　law；　all　the　rest　may　indeed　be　called　principles　of　the

will　but　not　laws；　since　whatever　is　only　necessary　for　the　attainment

of　some　arbitrary　purpose　may　be　considered　as　in　itself　contingent；

and　we　can　at　any　time　be　free　from　the　precept　if　we　give　up　the

purpose；　on　the　contrary；　the　unconditional　command　leaves　the　will　no

liberty　to　choose　the　opposite；　consequently　it　alone　carries　with

it　that　necessity　which　we　require　in　a　law。

　　Secondly；　in　the　case　of　this　categorical　imperative　or　law　of

morality；　the　difficulty　（of　discerning　its　possibility）　is　a　very

profound　one。　It　is　an　a　priori　synthetical　practical　proposition；*

and　as　there　is　so　much　difficulty　in　discerning　the　possibility　of

speculative　propositions　of　this　kind；　it　may　readily　be　supposed　that

the　difficulty　will　be　no　less　with　the　practical。



　　*I　connect　the　act　with　the　will　without　presupposing　any

condition　resulting　from　any　inclination；　but　a　priori；　and

therefore　necessarily　（though　only　objectively；　i。e。；　assuming　the

idea　of　a　reason　possessing　full　power　over　all　subjective　motives）。

This　is　accordingly　a　practical　proposition　which　does　not　deduce

the　willing　of　an　action　by　mere　analysis　from　another　already

presupposed　（for　we　have　not　such　a　perfect　will）；　but　connects　it

immediately　with　the　conception　of　the　will　of　a　rational　being；　as

something　not　contained　in　it。



　　In　this　problem　we　will　first　inquire　whether　the　mere　conception　of

a　categorical　imperative　may　not　perhaps　supply　us　also　with　the

formula　of　it；　containing　the　proposition　which　alone　can　be　a

categorical　imperative；　for　even　if　we　know　the　tenor　of　such　an

absolute　command；　yet　how　it　is　possible　will　require　further

special　and　laborious　study；　which　we　postpone　to　the　last　section。

　　When　I　conceive　a　hypothetical　imperative；　in　general　I　do　not

know　beforehand　what　it　will　contain　until　I　am　given　the　condition。

But　when　I　conceive　a　categorical　imperative；　I　know　at　once　what　it

contains。　For